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Abstract This paper uses data for the UK and the Netherlands (1983q4–2011q4)
to test if hysteresis occurs in these economies, and through what mechanisms. The
novelty of the paper resides in the use of a VAR-IRF that encompasses previous
hysteresis studies, using long-term unemployment, productivity, capital stock and
real long-term interest rates, and in the use of specific Labour Market Institutions
shocks, such as benefits, taxation or unions’ power. This allows us to disentangle
what specific demand and supply-variables affect unemployment in the long-run, i.e.
the NAIRU. Our findings suggest that there is hysteresis in both countries, and that it
happens through several channels. Further, we find that the influence of Labour Market
Institutions on unemployment depend on their impact on the real wages-productivity
gap. These results have implications for structural and macroeconomic policies that we
also discuss. Finally, we investigate the impact of different supply and demand-shock
on long-term unemployment and discuss the relevant policy implications.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates if hysteresis occurs in the UK and the Netherlands and
what demand variables make this phenomenon possible. It is usually argued that
Labour Market Institutions (LMI) can explain the evolution of unemployment in these
economies since the 1980s (Nickell 1998; Nickell and Ours 2000; Broersma et al.
2000). These authors argue that high-trade union power, generous benefits systems and
high taxation contributed to high unemployment during the 1980s, and that reforms of
these LMIs have made unemployment reductions possible afterwards. In the UK, these
reforms include Thatcher’s programmes of liberalization and Blair’s “New Deal”, and
in the Netherlands, the “Wassenaar Agreements” and later reforms of the benefits and
tax systems. However, if we examine the response of variables, such as long-term
unemployment and capital accumulation to the recessions of the last three decades,
here presented in Fig. 1, we observe that these variables recover very slowly, if at all,
after these shocks occur. According to Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Arestis
and Sawyer (2005), this can influence wage and price-setting behaviour, and in turn
the NAIRU, generating hysteresis effects. This paper examines this hypothesis, we
test if there is hysteresis in the UK and the Netherlands and what demand variables
cause such phenomenon.
Several approaches have been used to test the hysteresis hypothesis in country-
specific studies. Some authors apply unit root and stationarity tests to study the
properties of unemployment series. If unemployment is found to be mean revert-
ing it is interpreted as evidence in favour of the NAIRU a la Layard et al. (1991,
Ch. 8). Alternatively, if unemployment exhibits a unit root, it is taken as evidence of
hysteresis. Some recent reviews of this literature can be found in Romero-Avila and
Usabiaga (2008) or Fosten and Ghoshray (2011). Evidence for the UK and the Nether-
lands is mixed and sensitive to the inclusion of structural breaks and changes in the
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Fig. 1 Long-term unemployment persistence and investment. Source: OECD.stat
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sample period. Furthermore, this approach cannot disentangle what demand-factors,
e.g., long-term unemployment or capital stock, propitiate unit roots.
This problem does not arise in other branches of the literature that aim at test-
ing specific hysteresis mechanisms rather than the properties of unemployment
series. This is the case of the wage-equation literature that examines the response
of real wages to unemployment duration. This serves to test Blanchard and Summers
(1986) hypothesis that shocks that increase the share of long-term unemployment
increase wage pressure and in turn the NAIRU, creating hysteresis. Available evi-
dence for the UK is mixed, Nickell (1987), Manning (1994) and Arulampalam
et al. (2000) find support for this hypothesis, but this is disputed by Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994) and Bell and Blanchflower (2014). In the Netherlands, this
hypothesis is rejected by Graafland (1991, 1992). However, this literature focuses
on the wage-equation and does not control for demand-factors that affect the price-
setting behaviour of firms, which could also cause hysteresis, such as, capital stock
(Bean 1989; Arestis and Sawyer 2005) or interest rates (Fitoussi and Phelps 1988,
p. 57; Rowthorn 1999). These omissions are problematic because they can bias
results.
Other authors use time-varying estimation methods to identify the structural breaks
on unemployment and the variables that cause such shifts, e.g. Logeay and Tober
(2006) and Srinivasan and Mitra (2014) for Germany and the UK, respectively. Srini-
vasan and Mitra find no evidence of hysteresis in the UK, although they only use labour-
supply measures to control for hysteresis. Further, this single-equation approach does
not take account of the interactions that shocks generate in the labour market. To con-
trol for these interactions, researchers use VAR-systems to model the labour market
and then use the associated Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to evaluate the impact
of shocks. Carstensen and Hansen (2000), Gambetti and Pistoresi (2004) and Binotti
and Ghiani (2008) apply this approach to Germany and Italy1. They simulate labour
supply-shocks to tests Blanchard and Summers’ hypothesis, and productivity shocks
to evaluate claims that this variable can reduce unemployment permanently (Stiglitz
1997; Ball and Mankiw 2002). However, these studies might also be subject to biases as
they overlook the potential influence of capital stock and real long-term interest rates on
unemployment.
Our paper extends available literature by estimating a VAR-IRF that allows us
to test for hysteresis effects through unemployment duration, productivity, capi-
tal stock and real long-term interest rates. This helps us disentangle what specific
demand-factors affect unemployment in the long run while controlling for the inter-
actions in the labour market and avoiding potential biases that existing literature
might be subject to. We use the most recent data for the UK and the Nether-
lands to estimate a Cointegrated-VAR model for each country and simulate different
demand-shocks, using the associated IRFs, to test different hysteresis hypothesis.
Further, we also consider the impact of specific LMI-shocks to investigate the LMI-
unemployment link. This is in contrast to existing VAR-IRF literature, where this
link is studied by simulating generic wage-shocks. Our approach seems more ade-
1 See also Dolado and Jimeno (1997) or Fabiani et al. (2001).
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quate for policy design given that available evidence suggests that not all LMI
increase the NAIRU (Nickell 1997; OECD 2006; Layard and Nickell 2011, Ch. 7).
Finally, we also study the impact of different supply and demand-shocks on long-term
unemployment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model. Section 3
explains our methodology. Section 4 examines the data. Section 5 presents our esti-
mations. Section 6 presents our IRF-simulations. Section 6 summarizes our findings
and their implications.
2 Wage and price-setting model
Our theoretical model draws from the well-known NAIRU model presented in Layard
et al. (1991, Ch. 8) and Layard and Nickell (2011, Ch. 1–2), LNJ hereafter2. We extend
this model to account for the following hysteresis factors, long-term unemployment,
productivity, capital stock and real long-term interest rates. We assume that the labour
and goods market operate under imperfect competition, which gives workers and
firms price-making power. In the labour market, imperfect competition is usually
characterized by the presence of unions or efficiency wages3. Accordingly, workers
negotiate a nominal wage based on their price expectation that allows them to achieve
certain “target” real wage (w − pe), which grows with expected productivity (y − l)e
and is moderated by slack in the labour market, i.e. unemployment (u). Equation (1)
illustrates this (all the variables are in logarithm):
w − pe = ω2(y − l)e − ω1u+ω4grr + ω5tw + ω6up+ω11lu (1)
As in LNJ’s model, workers’ “Target” is also pushed-up by several LMIs, viz-a-viz,
unemployment benefits (grr), the tax-wedge (tw) and unions’ power (up). We do not
consider other LMIs, such as employment legislation or minimum wages because exist-
ing evidence is generally not supportive of their influence on unemployment (OECD
2006, p. 59–107; Layard and Nickell 2011, Ch. 7). Further, Eq. (1) also grows with
long-term unemployment (lu) reflecting Blanchard and Summers (1986) hypothesis,
BS hereafter, that is, increases in unemployment duration raises insiders bargaining
power and wages, which in turn increases the NAIRU. See also Ball (1999, 2009) or
Krueger et al. (2014).
In the goods market, imperfect competition takes the form of monopolistic or
oligopolistic competition4. This allows firms to set prices as a mark-up over expected
wages (p − we) moderated by unemployment and expected productivity, hence, the
term “feasible” real wage to refer to this mark-up, here illustrated by Eq. (2).
p − we = −ϕ1u − ϕ3(y − l)e − ϕ2k+ϕ5(i − p) (2)
2 Similar models can be found in Manning (1993), Nickell (1998) or Gianella et al. (2008).
3 See the surveys in Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 2–4) or Manning (2011).
4 See Sawyer (1982), Blanchard (1988) or Layard et al. (1991,Ch. 7).
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Equation (2) is also a negative function of capital stock (k) to account for hystere-
sis through capital-scrapping. Bean (1989) and Arestis and Sawyer (2005) argue that
after a negative shock, capital accumulation slows-down scrapping part of the pro-
ductive capacity of the economy. As a result, some of the workers that lost their jobs
cannot be re-employed and add-up to the existing unemployment equilibrium, i.e.
the NAIRU5. Further, Eq. (2) is a positive function of real long-term interest rates
(i − p) to reflect claims by Fitoussi and Phelps (1988, p. 57) and Rowthorn (1999),
that firms’ (real) long-term cost of borrowing increases firms mark-up, and in turn the
NAIRU.
Assuming expectations are fulfilled in the long-run and equating (1) and (2) to solve
for unemployment, we find Eq. (3), the unemployment level that makes workers and
firms income claims compatible, i.e. the NAIRU. Further, solving for w − p, we find
the long-run real wage equilibrium associated with this NAIRU, Eq. (4).
u∗ = β12(y − l) + β14lu + β15grr + β16tw + β17up + β18k + β19(i − p); (3)
Where, β12 = ω2−ϕ3ω1+ϕ1 , β14 = ω11ω1+ϕ1 , β15 = ω4ω1+ϕ1 , β16 = ω5ω1+ϕ1 , β17 =
ω6
ω1+ϕ1 , β18 = −
ϕ2
ω1+ϕ1 , β19 =
ϕ5
ω1+ϕ1
(w − p)∗ = β22(y − l) + β24lu + β25grr + β26tw + β27up + β28k + β29(i − p);
(4)
Where, β22 =
(
ω2 − ω1 ω2−ϕ3ω1+ϕ1
)
, β24 = ϕ1 ω11ω1+ϕ1 , β25 = ϕ1 ω4ω1+ϕ1 , β26 =
ϕ1
ω5
ω1+ϕ1 , β27 = ϕ1 ω6ω1+ϕ1 , β28 = ω1
ϕ2
ω1+ϕ1 , β29 = −ω1
ϕ5
ω1+ϕ1
The NAIRU described by Eq. (3) is a function of LMI and demand variables. If
β12 = β14 = β18 = β19 = 0, the NAIRU is exclusively determined by LMI, as
argued by LNJ. In our case, grr, tw and up. These β-restrictions imply the fol-
lowing restrictions in Eqs. (1) and (2). First, β12 = 0 meaning that the NAIRU is
neutral to productivity, requires ω2 = ϕ3, i.e. productivity gains are fully reflected
in workers real wages. However, if wages are slow to react to changes in pro-
ductivity, i.e. ω2 < ϕ3 for long lapses of time, productivity reduces the NAIRU
(β12 < 0) as argued by Stiglitz (1997) and Ball and Mankiw (2002)6. Second,
β14 = 0 requires ω11 = 0, meaning that there is no hysteresis through unemploy-
ment duration. However, if ω11 > 0, then greater long-term unemployment increases
wage claims and the NAIRU (β14 > 0) as proposed by BS. Third, β18 = 0 requires
ϕ2 = 0, ruling out capital-scrapping. However, if ϕ2 > 0, then more productive
capacity reduces firms mark-up and the NAIRU (β18 < 0) as advocated by the
capital-scrapping hypothesis. Fourth, β19 = 0 requires ϕ5 = 0, the cost of bor-
rowing does neither affect the “feasible” real wage, nor the NAIRU. However, if
5 See also Rowthorn (1995, 1999).
6 Other authors suggest that productivity can also affect the NAIRU depending on its relative value to
wealth (Phelps 2000) and interest rates (Pissarides 2000).
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ϕ5 > 0, then real long-term interest rates raises firms’ mark-up and in turn the
NAIRU (β19 > 0).
On the other hand, if any of the restrictions β12 = β14 = β18 = β19 = 0 does not
hold, then the NAIRU is determined by either y − l or lu or k or i −p, respectively.
These variables are sensitive to the evolution of demand (and macroeconomic policy);
thus, there is hysteresis7. This paper tests these restrictions to evaluate whether there is
hysteresis or not and what mechanisms in the wage and price-setting equations make
this possible.
In the short-run, expectations might not be fulfilled, and unemployment and
real wages will deviate from their long-run equilibria noted above. To find their
short-run levels, we need to solve the expectations terms in (1) and (2). We
adopt adaptive expectations on the basis that in our sample price and wage-
inflation, as well as productivity, seem to have a unit root8. Hence, considering
adaptive expectation and short-run mistakes, Eqs. (1) and (2) can be rewritten as fol-
lows9:
w − p = 2 p − ω2(y − l)+ω2(y − l) − ω1u+ω4grr + ω5tw
+ω6up+ω11lu (5)
p − w = 2w + ϕ3(y − l) − ϕ3(y − l) − ϕ1u − ϕ2k+ϕ5(i − p) (6)
Solving for unemployment and real wages, we obtain their short-run values as fol-
lows10:
u = β12(y − l) + β14lu + β15grr + β16tw + β17up + β18k
+β19(i − p) + δ112 p + δ122w + δ13(y − l) (7)
(w − p) = β22(y − l) + β24lu + β25grr + β26tw + β27up + β28k
+β29(i − p) + δ212 p + δ222w + δ23(y − l) (8)
3 Methodology
A VAR-IRF approach is particularly well equipped to study hysteresis in the labour
market. IRF-simulations allow us to simulate different demand-shocks to investigate
7 For some authors, the interest rates-NAIRU link does not create a monetary policyNAIRU link (Hian
Teck and Phelps 1992, p. 896; Gianella et al. 2008, p. 21). They argue that changes in real long-term
interest rates are not the result of changes in monetary policy but the evolution of financial markets along
with governments’ fiscal position. This claim is at odds with Central Bank pass-through estimates in the
UK (Gulmaraes 2012) and the Netherlands (ECB 2009). Hence, we treat real long-term interest rates as a
demand variable.
8
“Appendix C” presents unit roots/stationarity test results for w, p, (y − l).
9
“Appendix D” provides further details of our expectations and short-run considerations.
10 Where, δ11 = 1ω1+ϕ1 , δ12 =
1
ω1+ϕ1 , δ13 =
ω2−ϕ3
ω1+ϕ1 , and δ21 =
ϕ1
ω1+ϕ1 , δ22 = −
ω1
ω1+ϕ1 ,
δ23 = ω2 − ω1 ω2−ϕ3ω1+ϕ1 .
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what variables have a long-term impact on unemployment, i.e. affect the NAIRU
and cause hysteresis, and what variables only have temporary or cyclical influence
(Dolado and Jimeno 1997; Fabiani et al. 2001). Further, the system nature of the
VAR-IRF provides a wealth of estimates capturing not only the influence of a specific
variable on unemployment, but also on the rest of variables of the system, e.g. real
wages and productivity, to assess the mechanism that permits the relationship with
unemployment. That is, it allows us to test the restrictions on β, together with those
for ω and ϕ. Finally, the VAR accommodates the potential endogeneity between our
macroeconomic and labour variables.
We estimate a VAR for the vector zt that contains all the variables included in
Eqs. (1)–(4), i.e. zt = (wt − pt , yt − lt , ut , lut , grr t , twt , upt , kt , it − pt )′ . Unit
root and stationarity tests suggest that we should treat these variables as I (1), see
“Appendix C”. Hence, we adopt a cointegrated-VAR approach illustrated by the fol-
lowing Vector Error Correction Model (VECM):
zt = c0+Φ1zt−1 + · · · + Φn−1zt−n+1+γβ ′
[
zt−1
T
]
+λxt+εt (9)
where  is the first difference operator, zt is a (9 × 1) vector of I (1) variables. c0
is a vector of intercepts. zt−n+1 is the higher lag of zt , where n denotes the lag
order of the underlying VAR. γβ ′
[ zt−1
T
]
is the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM)
of the system, with β ′ and γ denoting the matrix of long-run and loading coefficients,
respectively. T is a vector of time-trends that account for the deterministic trends that
some variables exhibit, see Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 discussed in the next section. We restrict
T to the ECM-term to avoid quadratic trends. xt is a (h × 1) vector of exogenous
I (0) variables that controls for past external cost-shocks with two lags of pvmt 11.
In the Dutch case, xt also contains two dummies D95q2 and D07q2 that accom-
modate outliers, which caused autocorrelation and normality issues in preliminary
estimations12. εt is a vector of error terms, Normally and Independently Distributed
(NID).
Drawing from AIC and SBC selection criteria, we favour a lag order n = 2.
This choice and the composition of xt are the result of experimenting with several
specifications, until a parsimonious but informative lag structure that provides sat-
isfactory diagnostic test results is found. Hence, our empirical specification is the
following:
11 We tested if pvmt enters our cointegrated vectors. However, imposing the restriction of a zero coefficient
for pvmt on our cointegrated vectors could not be rejected in either country, with X2LR(12) =13.919 and p
value=0.306 in the UK, and X2LR(9) = 21.287 with p value=0.011 in the Netherlands. Hence, we restrict
its influence to the short-run dynamics. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
12 We speculate this could be the result of temporary changes in policy, such as the unusually expansionary
budget for 2007 set by the interim 3rd Balkenende Cabinet.
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⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(wt − pt )
(yt − lt )
ut
lut
grrt
twt
upt
kt
(it − pt )
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c0,(w−p)
c0,(y−l)
c0,u
c0,lu
c0,grr
c0,tw
c0,up
c0,k
c0,(i−p)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ Φ1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(wt−1 − pt−1)
(yt−1 − lt−1)
ut−1
lut−1
grrt−1
twt−1
upt−1
kt−1
(it−1 − pt−1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+γβ ′
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(wt−1 − pt−1)
(yt−1 − lt−1)
ut−1
lut−1
grrt−1
twt−1
upt−1
kt−1
(it−1 − pt−1)
T
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ λxt +
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
εt,(w−p)
εt,(y−l)
εt,u
εt,lu
εt,grr
εt,tw
εt,up
εt,k
εt,(i−p)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(10)
where xt,UK = (pvmt−1, pvmt−2)
′
, xt,Neth = (pvmt−1, pvmt−2, D95q2, D07q2)
′
.
Our empirical strategy proceeds as follows. First, we test for cointegration in zt
using the Maximum Eigenvalue (λmax) and Trace (λtrace) tests. Second, we identify
the long-run relationships that exist among our variables using restrictions drawn from
economic theory, as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (2002) and Garrat et al. (2006, Ch.
6). This provides an initial test of the β-restrictions by identifying what variables have a
long-run relationship with unemployment. Third, we estimate the short-run dynamics
of the system, evaluate the goodness of the fit and the stability of the estimated VAR.
Fourth, we use IRF to simulate different demand and supply-shocks (of one standard
deviation of the residuals, σε) and test the hysteresis hypothesis embedded in the β, ω
and ϕ coefficients. It should be noted that all IRF reported in Sect. 6 are Generalized-
IRF (GIRF), to ensure that the ordering of variables in the VAR-system does not affect
the outcome of our simulations (Garrat et al. 2006, p. 142).
These are the IRF-simulations presented below: (i) Shocks in unemployment (σεˆu )
and long-term unemployment (σεˆlu ) to assess BS hysteresis hypothesis, ω11 = 0 and
β14 = 0. (ii) Productivity shock (σεˆy−l ) to evaluate its impact on unemployment
and real wages, i.e. β12 = 0, ω2 = ϕ3. (iii) Capital stock shock (σεˆk ) to assess
the capital-scrapping hypothesis, β18 = 0. (iv) Shock in real long-term interest rates
(σεˆ(i−p) ) to evaluate the response of unemployment, β19 = 0. (v) Three LMI-shocks,
unemployment benefits (σεˆgrr ), labour taxation (σεˆtw), and unions power (σεˆup ) to
assess the response of unemployment (β15 > 0, β16 > 0 and β17 > 0). (vi) We
examine the response of long-term unemployment to the above-mentioned demand
and supply-shocks.
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4 Data
Our dataset contains quarterly data for the UK and the Netherlands from 1983q4 to
2011q4. The sample period is determined by data availability. The main source of
data is OECD’s statistical office, although we also employ data from UK’s Office of
National Statistics and the IMF, see “Appendix A” for further details. The following
figures examine our data (in logarithm scale). Figure 2 shows the evolution of unem-
ployment. In both countries, unemployment seems to trend downwards after peaking
in the early-1980s, and despite hikes in the early-1990s, early-2000s, and after 2007.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of our LMIs (solid line) against unemployment (dotted
line). Unemployment benefits (grr) in panels (a) and (b), the tax-wedge (tw) in panels
(c) and (d), and unions’ power (up) in panels (e) and (f), all trend downwards for
most of the sample period. This reflects the labour market reforms introduced in both
countries since the 1980s (Siebert 1997; Nickell and Ours 2000; Brandt et al. 2005;
OECD 2000, 2006). The downward trends of LMI and unemployment since the 1980s
seem to suggest that there is a positive relationship between these variables. However,
close examination shows that only unemployment benefits, particularly in the UK,
moved with unemployment over the sample period. The tax-wedge, panels (c) and
(d), moves downwards with unemployment up to the late-1980s, but for most of the
1990s and 2000s labour taxation and unemployment move in opposite directions.
Similarly, unions’ power shown in panels (e) and (f). Our IRFs will confirm that only
unemployment benefits have a positive long-run relationship with unemployment.
We turn now to demand-factors that could cause hysteresis. Figure 4, panels (a)
and (b), present the evolution of long-term unemployment (lu) against total unem-
ployment (u). In both countries, lu mirrors the behaviour of overall unemployment
with some delay. This suggests that demand-shocks can increase (and reduce) long-
term unemployment in line with BS hypothesis. In panels (c) and (d), we observe
the evolution of capital accumulation (k) along with unemployment (u). In both
countries, there seems to be a negative relationship between k and u, as periods of
greater accumulation coincide with reductions of unemployment, e.g. the second half
of the 1980s and 1990s. And periods of lower investment come with rising unemploy-
ment, e.g. the early-1980s, early-1990s and after 2007. This behaviour is consistent
with the capital-scrapping hypothesis. Our IRFs will suggest that this relationship is
statistically significant.
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Fig. 2 Unemployment
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Fig. 4 Long-term unemployment and capital accumulation
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Figure 5, panels (a) and (b), compare the evolution of productivity (y − l) and
unemployment (u). The former exhibits a clear upward trend in both countries, despite
marked falls in 2007, and several periods of stagnation in the early 1980s, between
1988–1992, early 2000s, and in the UK, after 2008. Some of these slowdowns in y − l
coincide with hikes in unemployment, suggesting that there is a negative relationship
between these variables, which our IRFs will confirm. Looking at panel (c), in the
UK, this relationship could be the result of real wages lagging behind productivity, as
the reductions in unemployment during the late 1980s, and from mid-1990s to 2007,
are characterized by y − l growing faster than w − p. This is unclear in the Dutch
case, panel (d), where w − p grow above y − l in periods of rising but also falling
unemployment. Further, in the Netherlands the relationship between y − l and w − p
seems weaker than in the UK.
Finally, Fig. 6 compares the evolution of real long-term interest rates (i − p) and
unemployment. In both countries, there is an initial period of relatively high but stable
interest rates until the early-1990s, period in which the highest levels of unemployment
were recorded. The rest of the sample period is characterized by an intense fall in i−p
UK Netherlands
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123
A. Rodriguez-Gil
that coincides with falling unemployment from the mid-1990s to the early-2000s, but
also with rising joblessness in the 2000s. Hence, from these figures, it is unclear
whether there is a relationship between these variables and whether this is positive or
negative.
5 Model estimation
We start our empirical analysis by testing for cointegration in zt = (wt − pt , yt −
lt , ut , lut , grr t , twt , upt , kt , it − pt )′ . Table 1 presents our results. In both coun-
tries, Maximum Eigenvalue (λmax) and Trace (λtrace) tests support the existence of
cointegration, as the null r = 0 is rejected at one per cent significance level for both
tests13. However, tests differ with regard to the number of long-run relationships. In
the UK’s case, λmax fails to reject the null hypothesis of having two long-run rela-
tionships, while λtrace fails to reject having four cointegrated vectors, both at one per
cent. For the Netherlands, λmax and λtrace, fail to reject the null of having two and five
cointegrated vectors, respectively. Weighting these results against the predictions from
our theoretical model, which suggest that there are two cointegrated vectors among
our variables, Eqs. (3) and (4), it seems reasonable to proceed under the assumption
of r = 2. This choice is vindicated by the diagnostic tests for our short-run equations,
reported in Table 3 below, which suggest that the model is specified satisfactorily.
Next, we study what variables take part in these two cointegrated vectors by identi-
fying the matrix of long-run coefficients, β in Eq. (10). For this purpose, we draw from
economic theory and experiment with several schemes. These include βs exclusively
determined by LMIs and extensions of these with demand variables, see “Appendix B”
for further details. In both countries, there is little support for a β exclusively deter-
mined by LMIs, as restrictions excluding all demand-factors are insignificant for both
countries. In the UK, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic is X2LR(10) = 52.351, and in
the Netherlands X2LR(10) = 69.395. In both cases, p value = 0.000.
Further, excluding lut and kt from the unemployment vector pushes β into rejection
in both countries, suggesting that these variables are cointegrated with unemployment.
Unit-proportionality between real wages and productivity seems supported in the UK
but not in the Netherlands. Further, the co-trending hypothesis (excluding T from
the cointegrated vector) seems to hold in both vectors for the UK, but only in the
unemployment vector for the Netherlands. Using this information we experiment until
we find a significant β-matrix of long-run coefficients for each country that we adopt
as our preferred long-run specifications, here reported in Table 2. These cointegrated
vectors are clearly significant. In the UK, the LR-statistic is X2LR(10) = 10.307 with p
values=0.414, and in the Netherlands, X2LR(6) = 4.135 with p value=0.658.
According to Table 2, in the UK unemployment is cointegrated with long-term
unemployment and capital stock, with long-run elasticities of 0.83 and − 0.15, respec-
tively. These findings are in accordance with previous cointegration analysis of British
unemployment (Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 1998, 2000). Results for the
13 Given the well-known size problems of these tests we use 1% critical values rather than standard 5%.
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Table 1 Cointegration tests
H0 H1 UK Netherlands
λmax test λtrace test λmax test λtrace test
r = 0 r = 1 68.28 [0.009] 318.62 [0.000] 81.05 [0.000] 343.01 [0.000]
r ≤ 1 r = 2 63.12 [0.006] 250.34 [0.000] 72.99 [0.000] 261.96 [0.000]
r ≤ 2 r = 3 54.82 [0.013] 187.22 [0.000] 49.44 [0.062] 188.97 [0.000]
r ≤ 3 r = 4 37.05 [0.266] 132.40 [0.003] 40.90 [0.177] 139.54 [0.001]
r ≤ 4 r = 5 35.64 [0.097] 95.35 [0.013] 34.59 [0.127] 98.64 [0.007]
r ≤ 5 r = 6 22.34 [0.481] 59.72 [0.105] 28.48 [0.132] 64.05 [0.046]
r ≤ 6 r = 7 18.91 [0.323] 37.37 [0.161] 16.63 [0.504] 35.57 [0.226]
r ≤ 7 r = 8 14.36 [0.239] 18.46 [0.320] 14.16 [0.252] 18.94 [0.291]
r ≤ 8 r = 9 4.10 [0.729] 4.10 [0.727] 4.77 [0.636] 4.77 [0.635]
p values in square brackets. Test statistics obtained from applying λmax and λtrace tests to zt using a VAR(2)
with unrestricted intercepts, restricted trend-coefficients and two lags of pvm. Netherlands’ computations
also includes D95q2 and D07q2. For both countries, we use 110 observations, 1984q3–2011q4
Netherlands are similar, an increase in lu of 1% increases the overall unemployment
rate by 1.9% in the long-run, whereas an increase in k of one per cent reduces unem-
ployment by 2%. Arestis et al. (2007) report similar results. Further, in the Netherlands,
we find unemployment cointegrated with real long-term interest rates, with an elastic-
ity of − 1.2. This sign is unexpected because the cost of borrowing and unemployment
are usually thought to have a positive relationship. We investigate this further in our
IRF section.
Finally, in the second cointegrated vector, real wages are positively cointegrated
with productivity in the UK, where we find a long-run one-to-one relationship between
real wages and productivity as also reported by Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal
(1998). In the Netherlands, unit-proportionality is rejected and the unrestricted coef-
ficient suggests that there is a very modest long-run relationship between real wages
and productivity, in contrasts to Schreiber (2012) estimates. Differences in the w − p
to y − l relationship, was anticipated in Fig. 5c, d, and reflect the well-documented
stability of the wage-share in the UK and its fall in the Netherlands. In sum, Table 2
provides evidence of long-run links between unemployment and demand-factors, in
line with hysteresis effects, we examine these links in more depth in our IRF section.
Next, we estimate the short-run dynamics of the system and evaluate our VAR-
model. Table 3, presents the reduced ECM-form for ut and (w − p)t contained in
Eq. (10). These estimates provide valuable information about the short-run dynamics
of unemployment and real wages that will be helpful to understand the IRF below. Our
estimates of the coefficient of ξˆ1,t−1, suggest that deviations from unemployment’s
long-run equilibrium imply modest adjustments, below 5% every quarter, in both
countries. Further, this coefficient is only significant for ut , in the Netherlands.
Estimates for ξˆ2,t−1, imply larger adjustments in both unemployment and real wages,
but this coefficient is only significant at 5% in the UK for ut and in the Netherlands
for (w − p)t . Estimates for ξˆ1,t−1 and ξˆ2,t−1 will be helpful in interpreting the
response of unemployment to the shocks that we examine below.
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Table 3 Short-run dynamics
UK 1984q3–2011q4 Netherlands 1984q3–2011q4
ut (wt − pt ) ut (wt − pt )
ξˆ1,t−1 − 0.022 [0.438] 0.010 [0.341] − 0.045§ [0.001] − 0.006 [0.230]
ξˆ2,t−1 0.211§ [0.004] 0.010 [0.700] 0.259 [0.382] − 0.301§ [0.013]
Observations 110 110 110 110
Adj. R2 0.522 0.243 0.803 0.200
X2SC(4) 8.452* 3.599 5.989 1.224
[0.076] [0.463] [0.200] [0.874]
X2FF(1) 2.754* 0.546 0.308 3.330*
[0.097] [0.460] [0.579] [0.071]
X2Norm(2) 4.354 0.069 2.584 0.636
[0.113] [0.966] [0.275] [0.728]
X2Het(1) 0.001 0.002 0.215 0.712
[0.975] [0.963] [0.643] [0.399]
Note: Further estimation details can be found in “Appendix B”
p values for t tests and diagnostic tests in square brackets. § indicates significant at 5% and * at 10%. Adj.
R2 = Adjusted R-square. X2SC, X2FF, X2Norm, X2Het are Chi-square statistics for serial correlation (SC),
functional form (FF), residuals normality (NORM) and Heteroscedasticity (HET) tests, respectively.
For the UK: ξˆ1, t = u − 0.832lu + 0.147k
ξˆ2, t = (w − p) − (y − l) − 0.253lu + 1.375tw − 0.026up − 0.135(i − p)
For Netherlands: ξˆ1, t = u − 1.910lu + 3832tw + 2.016k + 1.198(i − p)
ξˆ2, t = (w − p) − 0.065(y − l) + 0.150grr + 0.324up − 0.728k + 0.049(i − p) + 0.006T
The regressions, presented in Table 3, pass all the diagnostic tests at the standard
5% significance level, this suggests that our model is specified satisfactorily. Overall,
our fitted values seem to do a good job in describing unemployment fluctuations in
both countries, this is reflected in the adjusted R-squares for both countries, reported in
Table 3, which are reasonably high, 0.52 for the UK, and 0.80 for the Netherlands. See
also Fig. 15 in Appendix B, which compares changes in unemployment implied by our
estimations against actual data. Further, the eigenvalues, of the companion matrix, see
“Appendix B”, are within the unit circle, which suggests that our VAR-system is stable
and adequately specified. Thus, we conclude that our estimations capture satisfactorily
the long-run and short-run properties of unemployment in both countries and proceed
with our IRF-simulations.
6 Impulse response analysis
6.1 Hysteresis hypothesis
We start by testing BS hypothesis that long-term unemployment increases real wages
and the NAIRU (ω11 > 0, β14 > 0). Figure 7 shows the response of real wages
(w − p) to a shock on overall unemployment (u) and long-term unemployment (lu).
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Panels (a) and (b) show that an increase in u moderates real wages by about 5 and
1.5%, in the UK and the Netherlands, respectively. The fall in Dutch real wages is more
modest, and stabilizes faster, after 16 quarters for 24 of the UK, reflecting differences
in our estimates for the coefficient of ξˆ2,t−1 in Table 3. On the other hand, a rise in
lu, panels (c) and (d), has no significant impact in the UK, but it increases w − p in
the Netherlands. This suggests that demand-shocks that modify the share of long-term
unemployment generate hysteresis in the Netherlands, i.e. ω11 > 0 and β14 > 0, but
not in the UK, where ω11 = β14 = 0. Our results for the UK are in line with Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994) and Bell and Blanchflower (2014), but our findings for the
Netherlands are in contrast to studies with data from the 1980s (Graafland 1991, 1992).
Figure 7 panels (e) and (f) present the response of productivity to the lu-shock and
help understand why real wages behave differently in these economies. In the UK, a rise
in lu does not affect productivity, but in the Netherlands, the shock raises y−l pushing
real wages with it, as per our estimate of their long-run relationship reported in Table 2.
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Fig. 7 Unemployment duration-shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines
95% confidence interval (CI). a w − p response to u-shock (σεˆu = 0.0249). b w − p response to
u-shock (σεˆu = 0.0208). c w − p response to lu-shock (σεˆlu = 0.0149). d w − p response to lu-
shock (σεˆlu = 0.0341). e y − l response to lu-shock (σεˆlu = 0.0149). f y − l response to lu-shock
(σεˆlu = 0.0341)
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Fig. 8 Productivity-shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u
response to y − l shock (σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0106). b u response to y − l shock (σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0095). c w − p
and y − l response to y − l shock (σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0106). d w − p and y − l response, y − l shock
(σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0095)
Figure 8 evaluates the effect of a productivity shock on unemployment and real
wages. Panels (a) and (b) show that, in both countries, a rise in productivity reduces
unemployment permanently, i.e. reduces the NAIRU. In the UK, the unemployment
rate falls on impact until it stabilizes at its new equilibrium at a rate 17% lower, eight
quarters after the shock. In the Netherlands, unemployment stabilizes at a rate approx-
imately 20% lower than its baseline. Hence, Fig. 8, suggests that β12 < 0 for both
countries. Previous results are mixed, but our findings reinforce evidence of a negative
relationship between productivity and the NAIRU in both countries (Broersma et al.
2000; Hatton 2007).
To test whether this productivity-NAIRU link is due to workers sluggishness to
adapt their income claims to changes in productivity, panels (c) and (d), compare the
evolution of productivity (y − l) and real wages (w − p) after the above-mentioned
productivity shock. In both countries, the initial response of w − p falls short to the
rise in y − l, this gap makes ξˆ2,t−1 negative and reduces unemployment as per our
estimates for ut from Table 3. Further, unemployment does not stabilize at its new
equilibrium until real wages start to close the gap with y − l, eight quarters after the
shock in the UK, twelve in the Netherlands. Hence, Fig. 7 suggests that productivity
influences the NAIRU because, workers income claims react slowly to improvements
in productivity, that is, ω2 < ϕ3 for long lapses of time, as suggested by Stiglitz (1997)
and Ball and Mankiw (2002). It is worth noting that in the UK the shock is eventually
fully absorbed by real wages, but not in the Netherlands, in line with our estimates of
the long-run elasticity of real wages to productivity presented in Table 2.
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Fig. 9 Capital stock shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u
response to k-shock (σεˆk = 0.0001). b u response to k−shock (σεˆk = 0.0007). c k response to u-shock
(σεˆu
= 0.0249). d k response to u-shock (σεˆu = 0.0208)
Figure 9, panels (a) and (b), present the response of unemployment to a shock in
capital stock. In both countries, greater accumulation reduces unemployment perma-
nently providing support for β18 < 0. British unemployment falls for about 24 quarters
until it stabilizes at a rate 17% lower than its baseline, whereas, in the Netherlands,
the shock pushes unemployment to a minimum after eight quarters and then stabilizes
at its new equilibrium, at a rate approximately 25% below its pre-shock level. These
findings reinforce available evidence of a negative long-run relationship between cap-
ital stock and unemployment in the UK and the Netherlands (Dreze and Bean 1990;
Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 1998, 2000; Arestis et al. 2007).
To assess whether this link is due to capital-scrapping during downturns, Fig. 9,
panels (c) and (d) assess the response of k to a rise in unemployment. We find that
effectively, increases in unemployment reduce capital stock permanently between 2.8
and 5% depending on the country. Hence, our results endorse the view that unemploy-
ment will persist after a shock unless pre-shock capital stock levels are restored, as
suggested by the capital-scrapping hypothesis.
Figure 10 evaluates the influence of real long-term interest rates on unemployment.
Panels (a) and (b) show that a rise in the cost of borrowing reduces unemployment
permanently by around 10% in both countries. In the UK, unemployment falls for eight
quarters until it stabilizes at a rate approximately 11% below its benchmark, whereas
Dutch unemployment reaches a new equilibrium, 9% below its pre-shock level after
20 quarters. This evidence suggests that β19 < 0 for both countries. The sign of
these IRFs is unexpected because Fitoussi and Phelps (1988, p. 57) and Rowthorn
(1999) predict a positive relationship and available panel data evidence seems to sup-
port it, e.g. Gianella et al. (2008). However, these studies do not control for capital
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Fig. 10 Interest rates-shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u
response to i − p shock (σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1930). b u response, i − p shock (σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1648). c
w − p and y − l response to i − p shock (σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1930). d w − p and y − l response, i − p
shock (σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1648)
stock. Hence, a possible explanation for this sign discrepancy is that their positive
real interest rate coefficient is, in fact, capturing the negative influence of capital stock
over the NAIRU. This highlights the importance of controlling for different hysteresis
factors.
To investigate the sign of our IRFs, we examine the response of real wages and
productivity to the i−p shock. In the UK, panel (c), the interest rates-shock increases
productivity by a larger amount than real wages for the first 8 quarters, this gap makes
ξˆ2,t−1 negative, which according to Table 3 reduces unemployment, as we observe in
panel (a). Afterwards, y−l stabilizes whilew−p converges towards it, which coincides
with unemployment stabilizing. Hence, the unexpected sign of unemployment seems
to be due to the response of real wages and productivity to the shock.
In the Netherlands, Fig. 10d, the shock also creates a negative gap between real
wages and productivity that could filter into unemployment through ξˆ2,t−1; how-
ever, both IRFs are insignificant. Hence, it seems more reasonable to believe that the
response of Dutch unemployment is due to the direct impact of real long-term interest
rates on the unemployment cointegrated vector, see Table 2, which would also reduce
unemployment indirectly through ξˆ1,t−1. It is worth noting that differences in the size
of the estimated coefficient of ξˆ2,t−1, for the UK, and ξˆ1,t−1, for the Netherlands, can
also explain why British unemployment stabilizes faster.
In sum, according to our impulse response analysis, there is hysteresis in both
countries through productivity, capital stock and real long-term interest rates, and in
the Netherlands, also via long-term unemployment.
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6.2 Unemployment and LMI
Next, we investigate the LMI-unemployment link by simulating three supply-shocks,
namely unemployment benefits (grr), labour taxation (tw) and unions’ power (up).
Figure 11 presents the impact of a grr -shock. In the UK, panel (a), unemployment
increases on impact, until it stabilizes 20 quarters after the shock at a rate 20% above its
initial equilibrium. In the Netherlands, panel (b), unemployment describes a J-curve,
and after an initial fall it stabilizes at a rate 2% greater than its baseline, although
this rise is only marginally significant. Layard et al. (1991, p. 441), Nickell and Bell
(1995), Broersma et al. (2000) and Gianella et al. (2008) also find that unemployment
benefits increase the NAIRU in both countries.
Figure 11c shows that in the UK, the grr-shock causes a larger fall in productivity
than in real wages for the first 8 quarters, which feeds into higher unemployment
UK  Netherlands
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Fig. 11 grr -shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u response to
grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0031). b u response to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0070). c w − p and y − l response
to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0031). d w − p and y − l response, grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0070). e k response
to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0031). f k response to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0070)
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through the positive coefficient of ξˆ2,t−1, see Table 3. The shock also reduces
accumulation, see panel (e), which reinforces the rise in unemployment. In the
Netherlands, panel (d), the shock reduces productivity below real wages through-
out, which should raise unemployment by making ξˆ2,t−1 positive. However, this is
somehow compensated in the first 8 quarters by a modest increase in accumula-
tion, panel (f), which allows unemployment to fall in the short-run, as we observe in
panel (b).
Figure 12 shows the impact of a shock in labour taxation. Panels (a) and (b) show
that this results in permanent reductions of unemployment in both countries. The
fall in British unemployment seems to be driven by a larger rise in productivity than
in real wages on impact during the first eight quarters, see panel (c), which reduces
unemployment through ξˆ2,t−1. Further, the shock also results in a faster accumulation,
see panel (e), which reinforces the fall in unemployment. In the Netherlands, in panel
(d), the shock has no significant impact on real wages or productivity for the first twelve
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Fig. 12 tw-shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u response to
tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0036) b u response to tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0117). c w − p and y − l response to
tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0036). d w − p and y − l response, tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0117). e k response to
tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0036). f k response to tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0117)
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quarters, while unemployment falls. Hence, it seems more reasonable to believe that the
response of Dutch unemployment is due to the direct influence of labour taxation on the
unemployment cointegrated vector, see Table 2, which could reduce unemployment
through ξˆ1,t−1, aided by rising accumulation that follows the tw-shock after four
quarters, see panel (f).
On the other hand, a rise in up, shown in Fig. 13, also reduces unemploy-
ment permanently in both countries, see panels (a) and (b). This seems to result
from the real wages-productivity gap caused by the shock. In the UK, the rise in
up pushes productivity above real wages for the first 12 quarters, see panel (c).
This makes ξˆ2,t−1 negative and reduces unemployment until the gap is closed and
unemployment stabilizes. In the Netherlands, panel (c), real wages falls below pro-
ductivity making ξˆ2,t−1 negative, which reduces unemployment. The shock also
increases accumulation, see panels (e) and (f), which reinforces the reduction in
unemployment.
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Fig. 13 up-shock. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95% CI. a u response
to up-shock (σεˆup = 1.206). b u response to up-shock (σεˆup = 0.0047). c w − p and y − l response
to up-shock (σεˆup = 1.206). d w − p and y − l response, up-shock (σεˆup = 0.0047). e k response to
up-shock (σεˆup = 1.206). f k response to up-shock (σεˆup = 0.0047)
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Thus, after performing our three supply-shocks, only unemployment benefits have
the expected long-run positive relation with unemployment. These results reinforce
available evidence that not all LMI have a pernicious impact on unemployment (Nickell
1997; OECD 2006; Layard and Nickell 2011, Ch.7) and highlight the importance of
considering specific shocks to inform policy design, a novelty of our paper. Further,
our results also highlight that the impact of LMI on unemployment does not depend
on the impact of LMI on real wages, but the impact of institutions on the real wages-
productivity gap and other macroeconomic variables, such as accumulation.
6.3 Long-term unemployment
We close our IRF-analysis by studying the impact of different supply and demand-
shocks on long-term unemployment. It is sometimes argued that correcting hysteresis
caused by unemployment duration requires supply-policies that increase incentives to
work, reducing benefits or taxes, rather than positive demand-shocks (de Koning et al.
2003; Tatsiramos and Ours 2014). To assess this claim, Fig. 14 presents the response
of long-term unemployment to shocks on unemployment benefits, labour taxation,
productivity, capital stock and interest rates.
In the UK, none of these shocks have significant effects on long-term unem-
ployment for the first 4–8 quarters, but after that, lu responds in the same fashion
as overall unemployment. That is, benefits-shocks increases long-term unemploy-
ment permanently, panel (a), whereas shocks in labour taxation, productivity, capital
stock and real long-term interest rates, panels (c), (e), (g) and (i) respectively,
reduce long-term unemployment permanently. This delay in the response of lu sug-
gests that it takes time for shocks to modify the composition of unemployment.
Hence, suggesting that quick interventions to prevent changes in unemployment
duration can help to prevent hysteresis, as argued by Ball (1999, 2009) Stockham-
mer and Sturn (2012). Further, our results suggest that if these preventive measures
were not taken, both supply and demand-shocks can be used to reduce long-term
unemployment.
In the Netherlands, the response of long-term unemployment, to shocks on pro-
ductivity and capital stock, panels (f) and (h), also follows the response of overall
unemployment with some delay. This is not the case for the rest shocks. Figure 14b
shows that after a grr-shock, lu falls from quarters 4–20, until it stabilizes at a level,
barely significant, below its benchmark. This behaviour is contrary to that of over-
all unemployment, shown in Fig. 11b, and suggests that higher benefits generosity
increases unemployment by raising short-term not long-term unemployment. The
opposite happens in response to a tw-shock, Fig. 14d, where the shock increases
the proportion of long-term unemployment, despite reducing overall unemployment,
see Fig. 12b. This implies that those unemployed for more than one year do not
benefit of positive shocks and need targeted policies. The i − p shock, Fig. 14j,
has a similar effect, although it only increases long-term unemployment in the
short-run.
Overall, Fig. 14 suggests that labour market reforms can reduce long-term unem-
ployment, although these need to be country-specific. Further, demand policies can
123
A. Rodriguez-Gil
UK  Netherlands
-4.0
0.0
4.0
8.0
12.0
16.0
20.0
24.0
28.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-15.0
-12.5
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-24.0
-21.0
-18.0
-15.0
-12.0
-9.0
-6.0
-3.0
0.0
3.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-30.0
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-17.50
-15.00
-12.50
-10.00
-7.50
-5.00
-2.50
0.00
2.50
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
pe
r a
nn
um
Horizon
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
(i) (j)
Fig. 14 LMI and demand-shocks. Note: Solid lines denote IRF point estimates and dashed lines 95%
CI. a lu response to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0031). b lu response to grr-shock (σεˆgrr = 0.0070). c lu
response to tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0036). d lu response to tw-shock (σεˆtw = 0.0117). e lu response to
y − l shock (σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0106). f lu response to y − l shock (σεˆ(y−l) = 0.0095). g lu response to
k−shock (σεˆk = 0.0001). h lu response to k−shock (σεˆk = 0.0007). i lu response to i − p shock
(σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1930). j lu response, i − p shock (σεˆ(i−p) = 0.1629)
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achieve similar results either by preventing that temporary shocks have permanent
effects, or reversing the long-term effects of negative shocks.
7 Summary
This paper investigated whether there is hysteresis in the UK and the Nether-
lands and what demand-factors can cause such phenomenon. Further, we also
investigated what specific LMIs affect the NAIRU and the impact of supply and
demand-shocks on long-term unemployment. We used a VAR-IRF model that extends
available studies by testing for hysteresis through unemployment duration, produc-
tivity, capital stock and real long-term interest rates, and by considering specific
LMIs.
We find evidence of hysteresis in the UK and the Netherlands since the 1980s.
Our results suggest that hysteresis happens because of the impact of productivity,
capital stock and real long-term interest rates on the NAIRU. In the Nether-
lands, the proportion of long-term unemployed can also cause hysteresis. Further,
exploiting the wealth of estimates provided by our VAR-system, we find that pro-
ductivity reduces the NAIRU because workers are sluggish to absorb improvements
in productivity. The capital stock-NAIRU link seems to be the result of capital-
scrapping during downturns, and the impact of long-term unemployment in the
Netherlands is due to the influence of unemployment duration on real wages and
productivity.
On the other hand, we find that the only LMI that increases unemployment perma-
nently is unemployment benefits, although this effect is only marginally significant
in the Netherlands. Interestingly, we find that the LMI-unemployment link depends,
not on the impact of LMI-shocks on real wages, but on the impact of institutions on
the real wages-productivity gap and other macroeconomic factors. Finally, we find
that long-term unemployment can be brought down by country-specific labour market
reforms, as well as, positive productivity or capital stock shocks.
Thus, our results contradict the belief that LMI alone can explain the evolution of
unemployment in the UK and the Netherlands, since the 1980s. This means that pol-
icy makers aiming to reduce current levels of unemployment, have a choice between
labour market reforms, which must be selective and country specific, and macroeco-
nomic policies that encourage productivity, investment and the reduction of long-term
unemployment.
Appendix A: Data
See Table 4.
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Appendix B: Complementary results
See Table 5, Fig 15, Tables 6, 7 and Fig 16.
Table 5 Lag order selection criteria
Lag order UK Netherlands
AIC SBC AIC SBC
1 − 46.72 − 43.81 − 54.25 − 51.12
2 − 50.76 − 45.84* − 57.44* − 52.30*
3 − 50.80* − 43.87 − 57.00 − 49.85
4 − 50.37 − 41.43 − 57.05 − 47.88
* Denotes criteria suggestion. Statistics obtained from estimating an unrestricted VAR-model for zt , with
constant, time-trend, two lags of pvm, and the dummy D95q2 in the Netherlands. For both countries we
use 110 observations, 1984q3–2011q4
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Fig. 16 Eigenvalues of the companion matrix. Note: a UK, b Netherlands
Appendix C: Unit root and stationarity tests
See Tables 8, 9, 10, 11.
Table 8 ADG-GLS, UK
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) First differences
(wt − pt ) − 5.638 − 4.770 − 3.329 − 3.732 − 2.987
(yt − lt ) − 6.389 − 5.302 − 3.464 − 3.956 − 3.062
ut − 2.814 − 3.032 − 3.372 − 3.456 − 3.036
lut − 3.400 − 3.521 − 3.677 − 2.664 − 2.693
grrt − 2.569 − 2.633 − 2.733 − 2.941 − 2.943
twt − 2.943 − 3.097 − 3.273 − 2.919 − 3.093
upt − 4.325 − 2.970 − 2.493 − 1.868 − 1.356
kt − 0.819 − 0.956 − 1.081 − 1.162 − 1.229
(it − pt ) − 6.559 − 4.882 − 2.795 − 2.456 − 1.798
pvmt − 9.348 − 6.197 − 5.285 − 5.659 − 4.707
pt − 5.028 − 3.940 − 2.423 − 2.470 − 2.059
wt − 3.858 − 2.826 − 3.018 − 2.476 − 2.121
(ii) Levels
wt − pt − 0.223 − 0.746 − 0.806 − 1.346 − 1.008
yt − lt − 0.213 − 0.611 − 0.641 − 1.258 − 0.845
ut − 1.212 − 1.907 − 1.620 − 1.204 − 0.987
lut − 2.560 − 2.407 − 2.223 − 2.008 − 2.627
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Table 8 continued
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
grrt − 2.243 − 2.191 − 2.075 − 1.921 − 1.683
twt − 3.396 − 3.294 − 3.117 − 2.906 − 3.211
upt − 4.967 − 4.497 − 4.203 − 3.405 − 2.984
kt − 2.381 − 2.724 − 2.498 − 2.310 − 2.210
it − pt − 3.691 − 3.236 − 2.309 − 2.596 − 2.099
pvmt − 1.308 − 0.950 − 1.052 − 1.031 − 0.802
pt − 0.421 − 0.617 − 0.691 − 1.317 − 1.139
wt 0.061 − 0.338 − 0.725 − 0.527 − 0.723
ADF-GLS(p) is Elliot et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. (i) 1st
difference, ADF-GLS statistics computed using p lagged 1st differences of dependent variable and an
intercept. (ii) Level, ADF-GLS statistics computed using p lags of dependent variable, intercept and time-
trend, except for pvmt where no time-trend is used. 5% critical value without trend= −1.950, with trend=−3.017. 1983q4–2011q4, 113 observations
Table 9 KPSS, UK
Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) First differences
(wt − pt ) 0.496 0.473 0.397 0.367 0.329 0.293 0.266
(yt − lt ) 0.396 0.465 0.412 0.393 0.365 0.337 0.317
ut 1.150 0.505 0.361 0.310 0.287 0.273 0.261
lut 0.752 0.297 0.208 0.172 0.153 0.142 0.136
grrt 1.590 0.601 0.402 0.323 0.287 0.269 0.259
twt 0.370 0.142 0.097 0.079 0.071 0.067 0.066
upt 0.033 0.058 0.092 0.115 0.141 0.149 0.171
kt 2.080 0.734 0.462 0.347 0.284 0.246 0.222
(it − pt ) 0.026 0.072 0.101 0.132 0.162 0.178 0.185
pvmt 0.243 0.301 0.325 0.405 0.426 0.462 0.460
pt 0.927 0.984 0.745 0.621 0.528 0.464 0.418
wt 2.890 1.530 1.090 0.889 0.752 0.658 0.591
(ii) Levels
wt − pt 0.888 0.320 0.204 0.156 0.129 0.113 0.102
yt − lt 1.140 0.412 0.264 0.201 0.168 0.147 0.134
ut 1.260 0.438 0.275 0.207 0.170 0.149 0.135
lut 0.748 0.260 0.164 0.125 0.104 0.092 0.085
grrt 0.660 0.230 0.146 0.112 0.094 0.084 0.079
twt 0.566 0.193 0.121 0.091 0.076 0.067 0.062
upt 0.750 0.412 0.330 0.282 0.246 0.222 0.207
kt 1.120 0.393 0.247 0.185 0.152 0.131 0.118
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Table 9 continued
Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
it − pt 0.322 0.231 0.178 0.154 0.139 0.128 0.121
pvmt 3.560 1.290 0.821 0.620 0.507 0.434 0.383
pt 2.360 0.810 0.498 0.635 0.291 0.245 0.214
wt 2.240 0.778 0.485 0.361 0.293 0.250 0.222
KPSS(l) is Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test with Bartlett window = l. 113 observations, 1983q4–
2011q4. (i) 1st difference, KPSS-statistics computed with and intercept and “l” lagged truncation parameter.
(ii) Level, KPSS-statistics computed with and intercept, time-trend and “l” lagged truncation parameter,
except in the case of pvmt where no time-trend is considered. 5% critical value without trend= 0.463, and
with trend= 0.146. 1983q4–2011q4, 113 observations
Table 10 ADG-GLS, Netherlands
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
(i) First differences
(wt − pt ) − 2.388 − 1.531 − 1.029 − 0.676 − 0.604
(yt − lt ) − 7.587 − 5.712 − 4.907 − 4.559 − 4.670
ut − 2.955 − 3.076 − 3.298 − 2.914 − 2.997
lut − 3.759 − 3.804 − 3.938 − 2.979 − 2.939
grrt − 1.731 − 1.740 − 1.743 − 1.757 − 1.777
twt − 4.229 − 4.622 − 5.215 − 4.570 − 4.869
upt − 2.862 − 3.033 − 3.118 − 1.953 − 1.939
kt − 1.126 − 1.555 − 1.698 − 1.549 − 1.521
(it − pt ) − 5.534 − 3.422 − 2.208 − 1.564 − 1.274
pvmt − 9.205 − 5.925 − 5.196 − 5.712 − 4.880
pt − 2.997 − 1.938 − 1.285 − 0.894 − 0.879
wt − 2.914 − 2.252 − 1.323 − 1.100 − 0.910
(ii) Levels
wt − pt − 1.346 − 1.221 − 1.203 − 1.353 − 1.768
yt − lt − 1.542 − 1.642 − 1.734 − 1.745 − 1.692
ut − 2.782 − 2.736 − 2.561 − 2.263 − 2.592
lut − 2.930 − 2.778 − 2.551 − 2.251 − 2.726
grrt − 1.856 − 1.777 − 1.674 − 1.574 − 1.458
twt − 4.299 − 3.983 − 3.516 − 2.889 − 3.047
upt − 2.169 − 2.010 − 1.752 − 1.546 − 2.290
kt − 3.913 − 3.422 − 2.322 − 2.000 − 2.123
it − pt − 3.879 − 3.112 − 2.577 − 2.473 − 2.519
pvmt − 1.432 − 1.086 − 1.249 − 1.218 − 0.968
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Table 10 continued
Variable ADF-GLS(1) ADF-GLS(2) ADF-GLS(3) ADF-GLS(4) ADF-GLS(5)
pt − 1.468 − 1.588 − 1.721 − 2.105 − 2.710
wt − 0.818 − 1.003 − 1.017 − 1.537 − 1.728
ADF-GLS(p) is Elliot et al. (1996) GLS augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root statistic for p lags. (i) 1st
difference, ADF-GLS statistics computed using p lagged 1st differences of dependent variable and an
intercept. (ii) Level, ADF-GLS statistics computed using p lags of dependent variable, intercept and time-
trend, except for pvmt where no time-trend is used. 5% critical value without trend= −1.950, with trend=−3.017. 1983q4–2011q4, 113 observations
Table 11 KPSS, Netherlands
Variable KPSS(0) KPSS(2) KPSS(4) KPSS(6) KPSS(8) KPSS(10) KPSS(12)
(i) First differences
(wt − pt ) 0.160 0.220 0.220 0.196 0.190 0.189 0.194
(yt − lt ) 0.081 0.106 0.106 0.113 0.120 0.119 0.119
ut 0.754 0.294 0.202 0.166 0.149 0.142 0.141
lut 0.240 0.105 0.081 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.077
grrt 1.890 0.712 0.475 0.379 0.333 0.309 0.295
twt 0.171 0.074 0.058 0.057 0.065 0.080 0.101
upt 0.553 0.224 0.163 0.138 0.124 0.114 0.108
kt 1.340 0.470 0.299 0.230 0.194 0.174 0.162
(it − pt ) 0.009 0.029 0.045 0.060 0.075 0.078 0.087
pvmt 0.221 0.257 0.266 0.326 0.350 0.387 0.400
pt 0.090 0.142 0.131 0.116 0.108 0.103 0.101
wt 0.461 0.423 0.345 0.280 0.247 0.227 0.216
(ii) Levels
wt − pt 1.790 0.646 0.405 0.300 0.243 0.208 0.184
yt − lt 1.270 0.466 0.300 0.228 0.189 0.165 0.149
ut 0.920 0.318 0.201 0.153 0.129 0.116 0.109
lut 0.500 0.178 0.116 0.092 0.081 0.075 0.073
grrt 1.990 0.685 0.426 0.316 0.257 0.221 0.196
twt 0.724 0.258 0.172 0.141 0.129 0.124 0.123
upt 1.300 0.443 0.275 0.204 0.166 0.142 0.127
kt 1.490 0.511 0.317 0.236 0.192 0.166 0.149
it − pt 0.305 0.205 0.153 0.128 0.114 0.106 0.101
pvmt 3.140 1.150 0.740 0.566 0.468 0.405 0.361
pt 0.933 0.332 0.208 0.157 0.130 0.114 0.104
wt 1.600 0.561 0.350 0.260 0.212 0.182 0.163
KPSS(l) is Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test with Bartlett window = l. (i) 1st difference, KPSS-
statistics computed with and intercept and “l” lagged truncation parameter. (ii) Level, KPSS-statistics
computed with and intercept, time-trend and “l” lagged truncation parameter, except in the case of pvmt
where no time-trend is considered. 5% critical value without trend= 0.463, and with trend= 0.146.
1983q4–2011q4, 113 observations
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Appendix D: Expectations and the short-run
We adopt adaptive expectations on the grounds that, as shown in “Appendix C”, price
and wage-inflation, as well as productivity, seem to have a unit root14. From the
evidence of a unit root on inflation, we can write inflation as:
p = pt−1 + v
where pt−1 is the lagged change in inflation, and v is a white noise. Then:
p − pt−1 = pt−1 + v
Taking expectations:
pe − pt−1 = pt−1
or pe = pt−1 + pt−1
Adding and subtracting p to obtain price surprises:
p − pe = p − pt−1 = 2 p (i)
Similarly, wage surprises:
w − we = w − wt−1 = 2w (ii)
Productivity also has a unit root, hence:
(y − l) = (y − l)t−1 + v
Taking expectations:
(y − l)e = (y − l)t−1
Adding and subtracting (y−l) and multiplying by minus one both sides of the equality,
we obtain productivity surprises:
(y − l) − (y − l)e = (y − l) (iii)
We can now, re-write Eqs. (1) and (2) in terms of price, wage and productivity
surprises by adding and subtracting the p into (1), w into (2) and y − l into both:
14 For a formal demonstration of how a unit root justifies adaptive expectations see Wooldridge (2009,
p. 388–392). We are grateful to an anonymous referee that has pointed out that a unit root would also be
consistent with the weak formulation of rational expectations, see for instance Forsells and Kenny (2002).
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w − p =(p − pe) − ω2[(y − l) − (y − l)e] + ω2(y − l) − ω1u + ω4grr
+ ω5tw + ω6up + ω11lu; (1’)
p − w = (w − we) + ϕ3[(y − l) − (y − l)e] − ϕ3(y − l) − ϕ1u − ϕ2k
+ ϕ5(i − p); (2’)
We can see that when expectations are fulfilled, in the long-run, surprise terms
cancel out and unemployment and real wages take the values indicated by Eqs. (3) and
(4):
u∗ = β12(y − l) + β14lu + β15grr + β16tw + β17up + β18k + β19(i − p) (3)
(w − p)∗ = β22(y − l) + β24lu + β25grr + β26tw + β27up + β28k + β29(i − p)
(4)
when expectations are not fulfilled, in the short-run, we solve the surprise terms in
(1’) and (2’) using (i), (ii) and (iii), we obtain the following:
w − p = 2 p − ω2(y − l)+ω2(y − l) − ω1u+ω4grr + ω5tw + ω6up+ω11lu
(5)
p − w = 2w + ϕ3(y − l) − ϕ3(y − l) − ϕ1u − ϕ2k+ϕ5(i − p) (6)
Solving for unemployment and real wages, we obtain their short-run values as follows:
u = β12(y − l) + β14lu + β15grr + β16tw + β17up + β18k
+ β19(i − p) + δ112 p + δ122w + δ13(y − l) (7)
where δ11 = 1ω1+ϕ1 , δ12 = 1ω1+ϕ1 , δ13 =
ω2−ϕ3
ω1+ϕ1
(w − p) = β22(y − l) + β24lu + β25grr + β26tw + β27up + β28k
+ β29(i − p) + δ212 p + δ222w + δ23(y − l) (8)
where δ21 = ϕ1ω1+ϕ1 , δ22 = − ω1ω1+ϕ1 , δ23 = ω2 − ω1
ω2−ϕ3
ω1+ϕ1
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